Two initial dissents were obstacles. Soviet officials tried to define as “strategic” any American or Soviet weapons system capable of reaching the territory of the other party – that is, negotiable in SALT. It would be a system based on the United States, mainly short- and medium-range bombers stationed on aircraft carriers or in Europe, but it would have excluded, for example, Soviet medium-range missiles directed towards Western Europe. The United States decided that salt-negotiated weapons included intercontinental systems. Its forward-facing armed forces were used to fight Soviet medium-range missiles and aircraft aimed at American allies. Accepting the Soviet approach would have had an impact on the alliance`s commitments. In August 1972, the U.S. Senate approved the agreements by an overwhelming majority. Salt-I, as we have learned, served as the basis for all the discussions on weapons limitation that followed. Official text: media.nti.org/documents/salt_1.pdf Of the resulting complex of agreements (SALT I), the most important were the Treaty on Ballistic Missile Control Systems (ABM) and the Interim Agreement and Protocol on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons. Both were signed by President Richard M. Nixon for the United States and Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, for the U.S.S.R.
on May 26, 1972 at a summit in Moscow. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union to limit the manufacture of strategic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The first agreements, known as SALT I and SALT II, were signed in 1972 and 1979 by the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and aimed to limit the arms race of strategic (long-range or intercontinental) nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. For the first time proposed by U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1967, strategic arms limitation talks were agreed by the two superpowers in the summer of 1968, and in November 1969 comprehensive negotiations began. The two agreements differ in duration and inclusion. The ABM Treaty “is indefinite,” but each party has the right to resign within six months if it decides that its ultimate interests are compromised by “exceptional events related to the purpose of this treaty.” The interim agreement spanned a five-year period and covered only some important aspects of strategic weapons.